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The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise
Grows
After September 11th 2001, the Chinese regime strove to include its
repression of Uyghur opposition within the international dynamic of the
struggle against Islamic terrorist networks.
Rémi Castets
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 Over the past twenty years, the unrest in Xinjiang has intensified and Uyghur nationalist
feeling has strengthened. This study aims to throw light on the causes of the current rise
of  Uyghur  nationalism  and  the  forms  it  has  taken.  We  shall  draw  attention  to  the
determining effect of a socio-political context driven by colonial logics in order to explain
how the nationalist ideology has been reinforced, with its aim of restoring to the Uyghurs
—or more generally to the Turkic-speaking population of Xinjiang—the reins of political
power within a truly autonomous or even independent entity. We shall also underline the
impact of recent changes within the political context of China and Central Asia1.
2 Xinjiang (East Turkistan2), which was annexed by China in the mid-eighteenth century, is
mainly populated by Turkic-speaking3 Muslims4, the majority of whom are Uyghurs5 (see
Table  1).  Despite  a  long tradition of  exchanges  with  China,  these  people  are  linked,
primarily by ties of culture and religion, to the Central Asian world. Probably this is one
reason why, though they are becoming increasingly integrated with China, they have
never very willingly accepted the idea of sharing a common destiny with the Chinese
people. However, looking beyond questions of culture, other factors at different times
have contributed to weakening Chinese sovereignty over this region. Thus, during the
first half of the twentieth century, driven by the local elite in contact with Turkey and
with the Tatars of Russia, Pan-Turkist reformism6 put down the first ideological markers
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of what were to become Xinjiang’s anti-colonial movements7.  At a time when Chinese
power at the centre was weakening and the great powers (such as Britain and Russia)
were attempting to exploit the various political factions to build up their influence, two
independent  republics  were  founded  in  Xinjiang.  The  Turk  Islamic  Republic  of  East
Turkistan (TIRET) was led by the emirs of Khotan and by anti-communist Pan-Turkists
and  was  centred  on  the  region  of Khotan  and  Kashgar  (1933  and  1934)8.  And  then,
between 1944 and 1949, the East Turkistan Republic (ETR) was supported by the Soviets
and based in the three northern districts of Xinjiang along the frontier with the USSR9.
3 From 1949 onwards, the re-emergence of a new and strong centralised power enabled
China to reassert sovereignty over the region. The communist regime then introduced a
nationalities policy modelled on the Soviet pattern: 55 national minorities (shaoshu minzu
), together with the Han, make up the Chinese nation. Ever since, for the first time in
China, this policy has guaranteed the recognition of the linguistic and cultural identities
of the national minorities, while granting them certain advantages, helping them to
integrate within the new system10.
4 At the same time,  once the opposition of  Pan-Turkist  separatists  and the last  of  the
underground rebels had been eradicated, the province of Xinjiang was transformed, in
1955, into an autonomous region. But this autonomy was in reality only symbolic, and
contrasted sharply with the real  political  autonomy that  many had been hoping for.
Indeed, the region’s political system remains under the control of the Communist Party,
itself dominated by the original Han population of China’s interior. The shortcomings of
this system built  up a powerful sense of frustration,  preventing Uyghur society from
realising  many  of  its  aspirations  and  from  challenging  certain  policies  it  had
overwhelmingly rejected; of these, undoubtedly the most unpopular was the colonisation
of the region.
5 From  the  1950s  onwards,  the  communist  regime  encouraged  the  settlement  of  Han
population centres in order to secure, control and exploit the region, which is rich in
hydrocarbons, mineral resources and virgin agricultural land11. Since 1949, the region has
seen  a  massive  inflow  of  Han  immigrants  mainly  directed  there  by  the  Xinjiang
Production  and  Construction  Corps  (XPCC)  (Xinjiang  shengchan  jianche  bingtuan).
Originally, this organisation had helped former soldiers demobilised after the Civil War to
settle down, by providing some advantages to its members.  These corps of “peasant-
soldiers” sent to the margins of the country to open up new pioneer areas did not survive
the Cultural Revolution, except in Xinjiang where they were revitalised during the 1980s
in order to pursue demographic colonisation while boosting the manpower needed to
provide security for the region. Subsidised up to 80% by the central government, the
XPCCs today control  nearly  one-third of  the local  farmed land and produce about  a
quarter of the provincial industrial output12. During the 1950s, the XPCCs had about a
hundred thousand members; today their numbers are above 2.4 million, of whom 90% are
Han (that is, one-third of the Han living “officially” in Xinjiang13). Thanks to the XPCCs,
and also to migratory inflows not directly controlled by the state, the Han population has
risen from 6.7% of the region’s population in 1949 to about 40% today, that is, more than
seven million out of a total of 18.5 million inhabitants (see Table 1). But colonisation has
not stabilised the region—far from it.  Its socio-economic repercussions, together with
Peking’s domineering attitude towards the regional political system, have generated a
malaise that has lent new vigour in recent years to Uyghur nationalism and separatism.
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6 This phenomenon has been catalysed at the same time by changes in the political context
of the region. Indeed, the victory of the Afghan mujaheddin over the Red Army and, with
the break-up of the Soviet Union, the independence of the central Asian republics have
galvanised Uyghur separatism.  Many of  the militants  have seen in the emergence of
national  states  as  homelands  for  the  other  large  Turkic  populations  of  Central  Asia
(Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan . . .), the justification of their own
aspirations to independence. Moreover, by reason of the cultural and religious ties that
the Uyghurs share with the rest of Central Asia, these events have given them hopes of
drawing  new  support  from  beyond  their  own  borders.  This  potentiality  for
destabilisation, the concomitant swell of unrest in Xinjiang and the rise of Islamism14 in
Central Asia during the 1990s have led Peking to react.
7 China, torn between the necessity for opening its frontiers to economic inflows and the
wish to isolate Uyghur opposition from any exterior support or “subversive” influence,
has  combined  its  policy  of  speeding  up  the  region’s  economic  development  with
strengthening  its  security  collaboration  with  its  neighbours,  pursuing  demographic
colonisation and stiffening its repression of those political  activities that it  considers
unlawful. But, by failing to take account of either the destabilising impact of colonisation
on Uyghur society or the demand for self-government among the local population, these
policies could not solve the real problems behind the growth of unrest. 
8 Colonisation and its  socio-economic consequences are much disliked by the Uyghurs:
they constitute the main grievance among the protest movements. Indeed, colonisation
tends,  through a complex process,  to exclude Xinjiang’s national minorities from the
benefits of economic advance. In attempting to stabilise the region, the central state has
made significant investments15 that have contributed to developing the local economy.
This region, once among the poorest in China, today, within the provinces of China’s
“Great West”16, now boasts the highest per capita GDP; in these terms it ranks twelfth
among all China’s provinces17. However, these encouraging macro-economic figures hide
pronounced inequalities that apply along ethnic lines. To Uyghur eyes, the investments
are directed first towards the areas of colonisation18, and have benefited the Han colonists
most of all. Thus, the per capita GDP in Han areas is far higher than that in areas where
the Uyghurs are still in the majority (see Table 2). The low figure for GDP per head in the
Tarim  Basin,  where  three-quarters  of  Xinjiang’s  Uyghur  population  is  concentrated,
makes it likely that a significant number of families have incomes below the Chinese
poverty  threshold  and  even  further  beneath  the  threshold  set  by  the  international
organisations19. 
9 At  the  same  time,  these  differences  in  income  imposed  along  ethnic  lines  underlie
unequal  access  to  the  educational  system—which,  in  turn,  serves  to  reinforce  the
economic  inequalities.  In  effect,  the  inability  of  the  poorest  people  to  finance  their
children’s schooling perpetuates—even more than linguistic handicaps20 and a sometimes
discriminatory  job-recruitment  system—socio-professional  inequalities  condemning
much of the Uyghur population to the lowest rungs of society. 
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The peoples of Xinjiang
10 Theoretically, the Chinese education system is supposed to make it easier for minorities
to climb the social scale, by means of a system of quotas and university scholarships.
However the partial withdrawal of the state from financing the education system has led
to  an  increase  in  schooling  costs  and  falling  numbers  of  scholarships.  With  the
liberalisation  of  the  Chinese  economy,  some  financial  security  is  more  and  more
necessary in order to pursue one’s studies. The poorest families do not have the means to
provide a full education for their children; and they have to restrict their years at school.
While Han families, usually urban and better off, can extend their children’s education,
and send them to the best establishments, the children of the minority communities are
unable to complete their secondary education (see Table 3),  which means they leave
school with fewer qualifications (see Table 4). 
11 These differences in educational funding combined with recruitment methods that are
often discriminatory in the private sector21 tend to perpetuate, over a period of several
decades, socio-professional stratification: Uyghurs are penalised in comparison with the
Han. The national minorities in Xinjiang are over-represented at the bottom of the socio-
professional scale and the Han are over-represented at the top. Thus, while the national
minorities represented nearly 54% of Xinjiang’s population in 1990, they accounted for
more than 76% of its agricultural workforce (as against 69.4% in 1982 when they were
52.8% of the total population), less than 41% of those employed in liberal and technical
professions and less than 30% of managers and administrators22. 
12 As the national  minorities  descend the socio-economic scale  in Xinjiang,  their  living
standards become more precarious because China has almost no social security system
whatever. According to the 1990 census, the infant mortality rate among the national
minorities in Xinjiang was 3.6 times higher than among the Han and their life expectancy
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was 62.9 years as against 71.4 for the Han. At the same time, unemployment among young
Uyghurs has led to higher crime rates and drug-taking—though these are culturally alien
to this Muslim society. Poverty, and also the inequalities mentioned above, give Uyghurs
the sense that they are excluded from economic growth to the benefit of the Han. The
status of “second-rate” Chinese citizen contrasts with the promises of wealth and equality
made by the regime at the time of Xinjiang’s “peaceful liberation”, and it has led many
Uyghurs to think that they have been fooled by Peking’s communist pretensions and that,
in reality, they are living under the yoke of a colonial regime. 
13 It  is  suggested,  in  the  debate  over  the  notion  of  internal  colonialism23,  that  under
administrations  that  are  colonial  or  perceived  as  such,  socio-economic  stratification
along  ethnic  lines  around  the  peripheries  of  some  states  is  likely  to  encourage  an
increasing  sense  of  identity  and  the  rise  of  nationalism.  Even  though  this  kind  of
approach does not explain all the factors and paradigms entering the equation in the
birth and the growing influence of nationalism in Xinjiang since the start of the twentieth
century, it does help us to see how such inequalities have favoured the strengthening of
Uyghur nationalism over the past twenty years. Indeed, going beyond cultural identity,
socio-economic and political stratification in Xinjiang has brought many Uyghurs to view
themselves as a lower-grade community, separate from the central community (that is to
say, the Han) that dominates the economic and political systems. To that extent, it has
favoured the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism24, fuelled by the distinctive identity
of the Uyghurs to legitimise the establishment of real self-government (which would at
last serve the interests of the Uyghurs—and not those exclusively of Peking and the Han).
14 The Uyghur elite, more numerous and driven to compete with the Han, have increasing
difficulty in fitting into the system25. It is true that the Chinese regime does attempt to co-
opt a proportion of the Uyghurs into the administration but, even though noteworthy
efforts have been made since the 1950s, it seems that over these last decades they have
not been enough to integrate all the new Uyghur elite inside the system. In the 1950s,
because of the small number of Uyghurs who had been educated, it was relatively easy for
them to find posts on a level with their expectations. Over the past twenty years, with the
end of the policy of the “iron rice bowl” (tiefanwan) and the arrival of greater numbers of
well-qualified Uyghurs and, in particular, Han in the job market, the integration of some
elite Uyghurs has become more problematical. Thus, many young Uyghurs of working-
class or middle-class origins reproach the Chinese regime for not providing them with job
opportunities  commensurate  with  their  training  and,  instead,  for  favouring  the
appointment of Han to management posts26.
15 The small amount of data relating to the ethnic origins of some of the Xinjiang elite
appears  to  support  such  contentions.  For  example,  in  1990,  the  national  minorities
provided only 28.8% of the total number of managers and administrators in Xinjiang27.
This state of affairs is also observable within the political system: officials drawn from the
national minorities are still under-represented in the Xinjiang Communist Party. They
accounted for only 37.3% of its members in 199728. Moreover, bearing in mind that their
loyalty towards Peking is considered suspect, they are often held down in posts with little
power or posts where they can easily be controlled. Admittedly, the Presidents of the
People’s Government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, of each Autonomous
Prefecture  and  of  each  Autonomous  Village  are  elected  on  the  basis  of  the  titular
nationality of  the autonomous administrative entity.  However,  as  everywhere else in
China,  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  (CCP)  is  the  controlling  force  behind  political
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institutions.  And the most important CCP posts in Xinjiang are held by Han loyal  to
Peking and not by members of national minorities. For example, it is revealing to note
that, ever since 1949, the post of Secretary of the CCP in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region has been occupied in an almost systematic way by Han Chinese.
16 In sum, while a proportion of the Uyghur elite is integrated, even very well integrated,
and has been for several generations, a growing number of the new elite find increasing
difficulty  in  fulfilling  their  expectations  and  feel  resentful  of  being  excluded,  even
colonised. Shifting this fault line, where the integration of Uyghur elites is concerned,
acts as a kind of measuring instrument for Uyghur nationalism. If the indicator moves
towards “fewer well-integrated elite”, the nationalist opposition is likely to show itself
more structured and more vigorous. Today, the fact that poorly integrated elite Uyghurs
are more numerous than before explains the rising discontent among young educated
people and the strengthening of their political opposition. Yet, the fact that a proportion
of them continues to be “well integrated” harms the structure of Uyghur nationalism by
preventing for the present the large-scale recruitment of officials likely to organise mass
movements.
17 Ever  since  the  dark  days  of  the  Cultural  Revolution,  the  relative  openness  that  has
followed Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power has left the way open to a vast movement for
revitalising  local  culture.  The  1980s  saw  a  return  towards  the  traditions  and  the
“imagined  foundations”  of  Uyghur  identity.  This  phenomenon  in  its  many  forms
manifests itself, for example, in the proliferation of books and academic research into
Uyghur history and culture. It has also taken the form, as among the Hui, of an Islamic
revival29. While publications relating to Islam flourished, mosques were renovated and
many new ones built. Similarly, religious education developed strongly: Koranic schools
were opened, attached to mosques on the one hand or, on the other, as private schools—
usually undeclared30. This Islamic revival, observed right across China, has nevertheless
assumed a distinctive dimension among the Uyghurs. For them it is part of a logic of
return (or perceived return) to practices formerly discouraged or repressed, but it is also
at  the  margin  part  of  a  more  militant  logic  using  Islam  as  an  instrument  for
distinguishing Uyghur values31 from the non-clerical and atheistic values promoted by
the Chinese authorities. 
 
Table 1 : Demographic strength of the main Xinjiang nationalities
Source: Fenjin de sishi nian: 1949-1989. Xinjiang fenci (The advancing 40 years. 1949-1989. Xinjiang
Volume), Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, Urumchi, 1989, p. 332; 2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian (Xinjiang
Statistical Yearbook), Pékin, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2002, pp. 107, 109.
18 The revival of the Uyghurs’ Islamic culture and identity has also led, during the 1980s, to
the formation of student associations aiming to promote the rights and culture of the
Uyghurs: the Tengritakh Association (Tianshan), the Youth Association of East Turkistan,
the Students’ Cultural and Scientific Association32… Some of these student associations,
which reflect the growing strength of the democratic student movement in China and
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challenge “Great Han chauvinism”, seem quickly to have adopted a militant style. This is
conveyed in a report reflecting CCP anxiety:
19 In the thirty years between 1949 and 1979, almost no demonstration was held by the
Xinjiang  minority  students  in  Xinjiang,  but  after  1980,  student  demonstrations  have
broke out one after another.  This is  a new phenomena.  Uyghur students from seven
universities  and  colleges  including  Xinjiang  University in  Urumqi  demonstrated  on
December 12th 1985. They were openly against the Central Government's decision. [. . .]
 Some of  the students from Xinjiang University got  together and organized this  well
planned and well organized political incident for which the Xinjiang University became
the headquarter. Before and after that incident, some pro-separatism posters and flyers
with contents such as: “Chinese out of Xinjiang”, “Independence for Xinjiang”, “Cut off
the  railroad  from  China  proper  to  Xinjiang”  were  discovered  in  Urumqi  and  other
districts. In June 1986, another demonstration was organized by a student association in
Xinjiang University. [. . .] Using the “support for the minority education” as a cover, they
attacked  Central  Communist  Party's  minority  autonomy  policy,  damaged  the  good
relationship  among  the  nationalities.  They  used  slogans  such  as  “No  big  Chinese
Nationalism”,  “No  Chinese  population  transfer  to  Xinjiang”,  and  created  a  very  bad
influence in the society.33    
20 Outside the campuses, the revival of the meshrep34 expresses the wish to revitalise Uyghur
culture and identity. At the start of the 1990s, young Uyghurs of the region of Ghulja
(Yining)  launched  a  movement  to  re-invigorate  these  gatherings  which  have  spread
rapidly. However, the movement has also taken, according to the Chinese authorities, a
“counter-revolutionary” turn. Fearing that it might become a focus for protest and “local
nationalism” (difang minzuzhuyi), the regional government banned the meshrep in 1995;
and the people who had launched the movement were imprisoned35.
21 This aspiration to greater militancy36 has also taken the form of clandestine political
movements37 that, in Xinjiang and in the Diaspora38, are founded on Uyghur nationalism
tinged with Pan-Turkism39. Admittedly, these movements are not “mass movements”—
and even less so in the present climate of repression. Uyghur militancy is driven mostly
by  a  fringe  group  of  young  students  and  intellectuals,  purged  regularly  by  Chinese
repression. Up until the 1990s, two successive clandestine groups in the tradition of the
pre-1949 oppositional currents, both quite durable, dominated the underground political
scene. Of these two nationalist Pan-Turkist parties, one, socialist and secular, relied on
Soviet aid, and the other came from the anti-communist and Islamic tradition centred on
the south of Xinjiang. Both could call upon a base of militancy that was relatively wide
compared with present-day groupings (see below). At the same time they were counting
on significant underground mobilisation to prepare for a general uprising in Xinjiang.
22 After 1949, the first big organised clandestine party was formed under the name of the
Eastern Turkistan People’s Party (ETPP) (Sharki Turkistan Halk Partisi). Mainly drawing in
Uyghurs but also Kazakhs, it was founded in secret, according to the Chinese authorities,
in February 1968; but, according to the militants who have now taken refuge abroad,
some of  its  cells  had already been active  for  several  years  beforehand40.  This  was  a
separatist Pan-Turkist party with Marxist allegiances. Well-structured and hierarchic, it
swiftly recruited former officials of the East Turkistan Republic as well as young people
from Turkic-speaking minorities. According to the East Turkistan National Centre, this
party numbered more than 60,000 members and 178 branches in Xinjiang41. These figures
are hard to verify. However, the ETPP is probably the largest secret organisation ever
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created since the liberation of Xinjiang. The rise to power of this underground party
seems to have been favoured mainly by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and by the
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. Indeed, the USSR did give help to the ETPP. As is
confirmed by Chinese sources and the testimony of some of its former militants, the KGB
developed its links with this party mostly through its agents active in Kazakhstan and
seems to have provided it with logistical support on several occasions:
23 The ETPP's Central Committee and subcommittee drafted articles such as “The Destiny of
the Uyghurs”, “Eastern Turkestan People's Party's Constitution” and “Eastern Turkestan
People's Party's General Principles”. [. . .]  they all claim [. . .] “Seize the power with the
help of the Soviet Union and establish an independent Eastern Turkestan Republic” [. . .].
Some of them even held the banner of Marxism and Leninism and proposed: “We want to
establishing  an  independent  country  according  to  the  Marxist  principle  of  self-
determination  of  different  peoples”.  [.  .  .]  On  a  dozen  occasions,  the  “ETPP”'s  Ili
Committee, Urumqi Branch, and Altay Bureau also sent their delegations to Soviet Union
and Mongolia Republic to beg for arms and the use of radio stations for their riots and ask
for military advisors. The Soviet Spy agency sent a group of fourteen people with spies
carrying radio transmitters, weapons and funds for their activities. These groups arrived
in Xinjiang and established communication with the “ETPP” nine times.42
 
Table 2 : Distribution of wealth in the main sub-regional administrative units in Xinjiang
Source: 2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian, op. cit., pp. 106, 110-115, 713, 715; 2002 Zhongguo tongji
nianjian, op. cit., p. 51.
24 The ETPP focused its activity on mobilising Turkic-speaking populations and officials in
Xinjiang with the aim of preparing a mass insurrection against Peking. At the same time,
it  took  up  guerrilla  activities  (sabotage,  skirmishes  with  the  police  and  the  Chinese
army…) and was behind various attempts at insurrection during the 1960s and the 1970s.
Still quite active during the 1970s, it was gradually weakened by the arrest of its leaders,
by the gradual falling away of Soviet support as the tension between Moscow and Peking
relaxed, and then by the decline of the communist ideology. Nevertheless, while the ETPP
was  in  decline,  a  new  party  of  anti-Marxist  opposition  was  developing  in  southern
Xinjiang.
25 As the Soviet  Union lost  its  appeal  among anti-colonialist  Muslims to  the benefit  of
revolutionary Islam, and as the revival of Islamism was gathering pace in Xinjiang, the
Islamic Pan-Turkic trend centred on the south of Xinjiang was given renewed vigour by
new young leaders. It was re-organised around the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) (
Sharki  Turkistan  Islam  Partisi).  This  Pan-Turkic  nationalist  movement  also  aimed  at
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renewing  Islam  among  the  Uyghurs  and  developed  from  networks  of  mosques  in
southern Xinjiang during the 1980s. According to official sources, it apparently generated
offshoots in numerous cities in the Tarim Basin, indeed as far as Ghulja (Yining), Turfan
and Urumqi43. Probably also inspired by the Afghans’ success against the Soviets, it really
came into prominence in April 1990 at the time of the Baren insurrection (near Kashgar).
The rising took the form of a jihad recalling that which led to the creation of the Turk
Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (1933-1934)44. 
26 The insurrection,  which lasted for  several  days,  caused several  dozen deaths  on the
insurgents’ side and forced the Chinese army to deploy significant forces in the region to
put down the rebellion. The Chinese authorities view the ETIP as part of the Jihadist
current on the other side of the Pamirs; and they consider that it gave birth to more
“radical”  groupings  such  as  the  Party  of  Allah  and  the  Islamic  Movement  of  East
Turkistan. Because of the little information available about this organisation, such links
are difficult to check and to determine as true or false. However, the slogans proclaimed
during the insurrection suggest that the ETIP at this time was more a renovated form of
the Islamic Pan-Turkism historically established in the south of Xinjiang than a pure
reincarnation of radical Islam: 
27 He  [Yusuf  Zeydin,  leader  of  the  local  branch  of  the  ETIP]  and  his  followers  openly
shouted: “Down with the socialism!”, “In the past Marxism suppressed religion, and now
it is religion's turn to suppress Marxism”, “Unite all the Turk peoples, long live the great
Eastern Turkistan!”, “Take Barin, establish Eastern Turkistan”.45
28 The subsequent repression prevented the party from being reconstituted on such wide
foundations, despite attempts at this of some of its members in the early 1990s.
29 Whereas the 1980s are perceived by many Uyghurs as a period of reduced tension, even of
an improvement in the relations between Uyghur society and the Chinese state, the 1990s
saw the emergence of a repressive climate that engendered powerful frustrations and
resentment. The 1990s increase in repression is generally linked with exacerbated Party
anxieties on several levels.
30 Nationally, the conservative wing of the CCP considered that the worst was avoided after
the Tiananmen events in 1989,  whereas similar events took place in consequence on
campuses  in  Xinjiang  (see  above).  It considers  that  an  authoritarian  crackdown  is
essential to ensure the survival of the regime. At the same time, at the start of the 1990s,
the  Chinese  regime  feared  that  the  accession  to  independence  of  the  Central  Asian
Republics, and also the spread of radical Islam in the region (see below), would seriously
destabilise Xinjiang if nothing was done. On the one hand, the accession to independence
of other large Turkic populations of Central Asia was likely to legitimise and strengthen
Uyghur separatism. On the other, the cultural links that bind the Uyghurs together with
the peoples of the new Republics, and also with the Uyghur Diaspora in these countries46,
allowed Peking to fear that solidarity would build up between the Uyghur separatists and
these  states  (or  certain  organisations  present  on  their  soil).  Firstly,  some  of  them
(Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan in particular) have effectively offered asylum to the new
refugees,  and  even  recognised  organisations  of  the  local  Diaspora  defending  the
independence of East Turkistan. Peking then applied itself to cutting off the militants
active in Xinjiang from these potential supports outside. By playing on the prospects for
settling frontier disputes and for economic co-operation, and by promoting co-operation
in the struggle against separatism and Islamism in Central Asia through the Shanghai Co-
operation Organisation (SCO)47, China persuaded the Central Asian republics to ban the
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Uyghur organisations  present  on their  territories,  and even today to  extradite  some
militants who have recently taken refuge there48.
31 On the domestic front, the Chinese regime confronted by the rise of Uyghur nationalism
and by Islamic anti-governmental subversion has progressively tightened its control over
society  and the  spaces  for  expressing  identity  and religion49 to  prevent  the  start  of
dynamics  that  might  have  made  the  situation  uncontrollable.  At  the  same  time  as
relations between the Chinese state and Uyghur society were becoming strained and
disturbances, sometimes violent, were on the rise (the Baren insurrection in 1990, the
disturbances of the summer and autumn of 1993 over the whole province, and the riots of
July 7th 1995 in Khotan), the Chinese regime’s grip was progressively tightened.
 
Table 3 : National minorities’ share in Xinjiang’s total school population in 2000
Source: 2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian, op. cit., pp. 612-613.
32 The turning point really came in 1996-1997, following the launch in April 1996 of the
great national campaign against crime “Strike hard”. This campaign began shortly after a
special  meeting  in  March  1996  on  maintaining  stability  in  Xinjiang,  and  so  there  it
assumed a special dimension, being targeted at separatism and illegal religious activities.
The Permanent Committee of the Politburo of the CCP then issued an exhaustive list of
strict directives aimed at tightening control over Xinjiang and eradicating potentially
subversive activities50. As part of the same campaign, a succession of strong-arm police
operations was mounted (the special 100-day crackdown from January to March 1999, the
“General Campaign against Terrorism” from April to June 1999, the new campaign “Strike
hard” from April  2001 onwards, the drive against separatism in October 2001…). This
intense campaign of repression led to thousands of arrests and also to constant human
rights violations and the improper use of the death penalty51. By fencing off, even closing
down, the last spaces for the expression of identity or religion52, these restrictions put
relations between Uyghur society and the Chinese regime under considerable strain. They
gave the impression that the real target of the Chinese regime’s attacks was not so much
separatism or even Islamism but Uyghur identity itself53. 
33 During  the  same  period,  the  introduction  of  a  market  economy  combined  with
competition from ever-increasing numbers of Han placed the social climate under strain.
Local politicians, in thrall to Peking, are unable to challenge policies imposed from the
centre and often very strongly disliked (nuclear tests on the Lop Nor site, the restriction
of religious freedoms, the enforcement of birth control while colonists are flooding in…);
this fact has provoked numerous protest movements. Faced with a strained social and
political  climate,  the local  authorities  (who cannot challenge the policies dictated by
Peking)  have  often  reacted  with  brutality.  They  have  sometimes  helped  to  give  an
insurrectional twist to protest movements that, originally, were merely directed against
unpopular measures54.  While the disturbances became more frequent55 in response to
excessive Chinese repression, throughout the 1990s new groupings appeared in Xinjiang
and the  Diaspora.  In  the  Diaspora,  most  organisations  began to  federate  around the
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rejection of violent action while lobbying for the Uyghurs’ basic rights to be protected56;
by contrast, in Xinjiang, groups with a sometimes reduced life expectancy, but adopting
more radical  modes of  action,  appeared.  They protected themselves by keeping their
memberships small, or withdrew from China (to Central Asia, Afghanistan or Turkey). 
34 They  carried  out  numerous  guerrilla  operations  (sabotage57,  arson,  attacks  on  police
barracks or military bases), and even graduated to acts of terrorism (assassinations of
Han officials or Uyghur collaborators, and bomb attacks). The increasing frequency of
acts of violence and terrorism in Xinjiang during the 1990s does not mean that all the
Uyghur  political  movements  support  these  modes  of  action.  But,  just  recently,  the
Chinese authorities have generally harped on about the frequency of acts of violence to
give the Uyghur opposition the image of a primarily terrorist force.
35 Only a short while ago, the Chinese government was opting to hush up the news of these
disturbances. However, following the events of September 11th 2001, it decided to put out
information about the more violent acts and the terrorist attacks carried out during this
period. It attributed some of them to armed groups who, to date, seem mostly to have
disappeared or become dormant58. The Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party are
held responsible for the attack that, on the Chinese New Year in February 1992, killed
three people in a bus at Urumqi59. The East Turkistan Democratic Islamic Party is held to
have  carried  out  the  bomb attacks  in  the  south of  Xinjiang that  killed  four  victims
between June and September 199360. The most memorable crime, that of February 25th
1997  in  Urumqi  (on the  day  of  Deng Xiaoping’s  funeral),  was  attributed to  the  East
Turkistan National Unity Alliance. Four bombs had been planted on different bus routes.
The resulting explosions killed nine and wounded 74. On the other hand, the Chinese
regime did not mention in its report the crime committed during the annual meeting of
the National People’s Congress on March 7th 1997: the bomb went off in a bus in Peking’s
Xidan district (30 injured and two dead). Responsibility for this attack, the first to affect
Peking since 1949, was claimed by the Organisation for East Turkistan Freedom (based in
Turkey),  but the Chinese government denied that any Uyghurs were involved in this
attack. 
36 At  the  same  time,  connections  have  apparently  been  made  between  some  Uyghur
militants and Islamic movements. This phenomenon seems to be linked to several factors.
On the one hand,  the socio-political  model  promoted by these movements may have
seemed a preferable alternative to the Chinese model perceived as colonial and culturally
invasive.  The  desire  to  establish  a  political  and social  order  that  would  put  Uyghur
Muslims at the centre of the system is very strong. Some Uyghur militants were probably
also influenced by the hope that by imposing a strict Islamic framework they might at the
same time find a solution to the present social problems. On the other hand, bearing in
mind the cessation of support (active or passive) from the USSR and later of the Central
Asian  republics  and  taking  account  also  of  the  indifference  of  the  West61,  the  vital
necessity of  finding foreign support  over which Chinese diplomacy had no hold also
played an important role. Some Uyghur movements saw in the Islamic card a means of
playing on the solidarity existing between Muslims within the Umma to attempt to win
political support, fallback bases, even training facilities and funds to further the struggle
against Chinese power in Xinjiang.
37 The first  links  seem to have been made during the 1980s.  During this  period,  many
foreigners  (traders,  preachers  62…)  profited  from  the  relative  relaxation  of  Chinese
control to proselytise their causes in China itself63. At the same time, with the opening of
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frontiers  and the  loosening of  restrictions  governing the Mecca pilgrimage,  Uyghurs
travelling abroad came into contact with proselytising movements working in Pakistan,
Central Asia or in some Arab countries. Links were created in these cases too. At the same
time also, as the restrictions on religious education in Xinjiang were being strengthened,
many young Uyghurs went abroad. Through connections established during the 1980s or
through family links on the spot, these young people—and also Uyghurs in the Diaspora—
took religious courses in the Koranic schools sometimes attached to Islamist movements.
38 Thus, in Kazakhstan it seems that some Uyghurs joined the Islamic Renaissance Party64. In
Uzbekistan and in Kirghizstan some of them joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU)  or  else  Hizb-ut  Tahrir  (HT)65.  The  other  favoured  place  for  recruitment  was
Pakistan. Chinese researchers suggest that about ten thousand Uyghurs went to Pakistan
to receive a religious education66. This figure is hard to verify. Nevertheless, some of them
did indeed follow programmes in fundamentalist Koranic schools in Pakistan, and were
even in  contact  with various  local  Islamist  movements  (Jamaat-e  Islami67,  Jamaat  al-
Tabligh 68…). Through these connections, some Uyghurs took part in military operations.
It  seems that  the Hizb ul-Mujahidin69 and the Salafist  Jihadist 70 movement Lashkar-e
Taiba in particular71 enrolled a handful of Uyghurs in the Kashmir conflict 72. However,
most of the Uyghurs involved in the Jihad were in Afghanistan (mainly in the ranks of the
Hizb-e Islami, the Taliban and later in the ranks of the IMU). Quoting official Russian
sources and Chinese experts, the Chinese press has published figures ranging from over
200 Uyghurs in the “bin Laden camps” to more than a thousand having received some
military training in Afghanistan73. Again, the figures are difficult to check. However, after
the fall of the Taliban, the new Afghan government claims it has only a score of Chinese
prisoners (who it has promised to hand over to the Chinese authorities).  So one may
presume  that  the  Uyghurs  amount  only  to  a  negligible  proportion  of  the  foreign
supporters fighting alongside local radical movements.
39 During the 1990s, some of these young Uyghurs formed in their turn a small number of
Islamist  (or  Islamic  nationalist)  groups  which,  according  to  Peking,  have  links  with
Salafist Jihadist networks based in the region. Because we have little reliable information
about these ultra-clandestine organisations, it is very difficult to be specific about their
ideology.  For  the  most  part,  they  begin  with  a  nucleus  of  Uyghurs  who  have  often
received Islamic training abroad and are sometimes trained in combat and the use of
explosives;  around  them  are  grouped  the  militants  they  themselves  have  recruited
locally. However, the fact that they do not recruit from the Hui and that their discourse
lays greater emphasis on liberating East Turkistan than on creating an Islamic state (or
on  returning  to  a  purified  form of  Islam)  suggests  that  their  agenda  is  still  mainly
nationalist74.
40 Without having carried out a massive recruitment, these groups have concentrated on
enrolling young people from the urban working class, mainly from southern Xinjiang.
Admittedly, the substratum of urban youth, disconnected with Islam in its traditional Sufi
form75, provides a reservoir of people that could feed the development of these groups.
However,  although  one  may  recently  observe  the  growing  power  of  the  neo-
fundamentalist Hizb ut-Tahrir group76, the Islamist groups in Xinjiang have lost much of
their membership and have been officially dismantled by the Chinese police. In reality,
Chinese security focused its attention firstly on the East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah
(whose name recalls Hezbollah). Founded in 1993 according to some sources and in 1997
according to others77, the membership of this organisation campaigning for the creation
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of an Islamic state numbered from one hundred to fifteen hundred. According to the
Chinese  authorities,  its  members  attacked  individuals  associated  with  the  Chinese
government.  A  wave  of  arrests  at  the  end  of  the  1990s  seems  to  have  uncovered
preparations for bombing attacks. In the end, according to the Chinese press, the Party of
Allah was dismantled a few years ago.
 
Table 4 : Differences in qualifications between Han and non-Han labour in Xinjiang in 1990
Source: Compilation based on data from the fourth census carried out in 1990 (Emily Hannum & Yu
Xie, op. cit., p. 329).
41 Yet, after the events of September 11th 2001, the marginal existence of this kind of group
was used by the Chinese regime to attempt to include the wholesale repression of the
Uyghur  opposition  within  the  international  dynamic  of the  struggle  against  Islamist
terrorist networks78.  While the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister declared in November
2001 at the UN that “the terrorist forces of East Turkistan are trained, equipped and
financed by  international  terrorist  organisations”,  in  January  2002  the  State  Council
published an ambiguous report laying stress on the supposed links between al-Qaeda and
the Uyghur opposition grouped under the falsely unifying label of Dongtu79. In fact, there
is no structure that controls all the Uyghur movements in Xinjiang and abroad; and the
vast  majority  of  them have no connection,  either  ideological  or  organisational,  with
radical Islam. Yet,  by stressing the supposed links of the Party of Allah and the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) with al-Qaeda, this report tends to lump together
disparate elements of this kind. According to the thesis proposed by the State Council,
members of these groups received training in Afghanistan. The leaders of the ETIM (a
group that until then was almost unknown) are alleged to have met bin Laden at the start
of 1999 and in February 2001; and he is alleged to have agreed to provide them with
“fabulous sums”80. It is possible that these movements, and particularly the ETIM, might
have  had contacts  with  the  bin  Laden network and more  probably  with  the  Islamic
Movement  of  Uzbekistan81.  But  the  Chinese  declarations  that  attempt  to  show
particularly close relationships fly in the face of bin Laden’s silence on East Turkistan.
42 For his part, the leader of the ETIM, Hasan Mahsum, assured Radio Free Asia on January
22nd 2002 that his ultimate aim was the liberation of Xinjiang; and he denied any organic
link with al-Qaeda.  Even so,  the Chinese lobbying did bear fruit.  It  enabled China to
persuade the US government, at the end of August 2002, and then the UN Security Council
to  include  on  the  list  of  groupings  linked  to  al-Qaeda  the  East  Turkistan  Islamic
Movement; it was given an extended description under a triple name: the East Turkistan
Islamic  Movement,  the  East  Turkistan Islamic  Party  of  Allah  and the  East  Turkistan
Islamic Party82. 
43 The consequences  of  the policies  pursued by the Chinese regime reveal  the political
impasse it has run into by attacking the expressions of Uyghur malaise without attacking
its real causes. Mao Zedong, going back on his promises, quickly opted for repression to
put an end to demands for self-government, which had been made as early as the 1950s.
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The Chinese regime then outlawed any kind of protest against the policies imposed on
Xinjiang;  it  also closed up most of  the spaces in which the culture and the religious
convictions of the Uyghurs could be expressed. In this way it fed frustrations that were
also exacerbated by colonisation and the socio-economic  stratification that  it  led to.
When, to reduce tension, the regime partially re-opened these spaces, the re-opening
simply allowed the power of Uyghur nationalism to grow. And since Peking closed the
spaces and reverted to repression, all hopes of self-government, even of dialogue with the
Chinese authorities, have flown out of the window. Now that relations have completely
broken down, acts of violence have replaced peaceful demonstrations as the expression of
the  Uyghur  malaise.  Isolated  as  they  have  been  by  skilful  Chinese  diplomacy,  what
remains of the Uyghur opposition in Xinjiang is now open to all kinds of extremism.
NOTES
1. This study is based mainly on data gathered by the author since the end of the 1990s in
Xinjiang and within the Uyghur Diaspora.
2. Sharki Turkistan in Uyghur.
3. Historically, these communities shared the various ecological niches in the area. The
oases to the south of the Tianshan mountains, that is to say the oases of the Tarim, Turfan
and Kumul (Hami) Basins are traditionally populated by sedentary Uyghurs. The Tianshan
chain and the steppes to the north are home to the Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads. To these
Turkic-speaking populations are added the nomadic Mongols to the north and east, a
Tajik community in the Pamirs and a few Uzbek and Tatar traders in the large oases.
Following the conquest of the region by the Qing, Han, Manchurian population
demobilised or sent there to ensure control of the north of the province, and Chinese
Muslims (Hui) came to settle.
4. These Turkic-speaking populations have in common to be Sunni muslims of the Hanafi
rite and to practise an Islam influenced by Sufism. Only the Tajiks of the Chinese Pamirs
depart from this rule. They are Iranian-speaking, and are part of the Ismaelian branch of
Shiism.
5. Until the twentieth century, these populations, fragmented by differences of identity
and by political and religious rivalries between oases, referred to their geographic origin
(their oasis of origin) to identify themselves. The term Uyghur refers to the Turkic people
who, in the Middle Ages, developed a brilliant civilisation in the east of Xinjiang. This
ethnonym, having disappeared since Islamisation, was revived by Russian ethnologists; it
was brought back into service during the 1930s by Soviet advisors of Sheng Shicai to
designate the Turkic-speaking sedentary Muslim communities speaking the Turki dialect
of the Xinjiang oases. See Dru Gladney, “The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur”, Central Asian
Survey, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1990, pp. 1-28; Abdurahman Abdullah, Tashkentchilair (Those who
have studied in Tashkent), Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe, 2002.
6. Pan-Turkism, which was partly confused with Jadidism in Central Asia, developed in
the 1880s among the Tatars of Russia. This reform movement aimed to restore political
influence to the Muslim Turkish peoples and to awaken their national consciousness by
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modernising them (educational reforms, theological reforms…) Though it cannot be on
the scale of the Turkish world as a whole, Pan-Turkism, closely mingled with Uyghur
nationalism, helps to unite the various Turkic-speaking populations of East Turkistan
behind the same political project.
7. Masami Hamada, “La transmission du mouvement nationaliste au Turkestan oriental
(Xinjiang)”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1990, pp. 29-48; Justin Rudelson , Oasis
Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road, New York, Columbia University Press,
1997, pp. 55-57.
8. Andrew D. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, A Political History of
Republican Xinjiang 1911-1949, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 63-121.
9. Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang,
1944-1949, New York, Armonk, Sharpe, 1990; David Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow: The
Yining Incident; Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949, Hong Kong,
Chinese University Press, 1999.
10. Barry Sautman, “Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: the Case of
Xinjiang”, Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities, Vol. 4, No. 1/2, spring/summer 1998,
pp. 86-113.
11. This colonisation policy, for example, has just been openly encouraged anew by the
Permanent Committee of the Politburo of the CCP on March 19th 1996: its confidential
session was devoted to maintaining stability in Xinjiang (“Guanyu weihu Xinjiang
wending de huiyi jiyao, zhongyang zhengzhiju weiyuanhui” An English version of this
text has been published by Human Rights Watch).
12. James D. Seymour, “Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps and the Sinification
of Eastern Turkestan”, Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000, pp. 171-94; Nicolas Becquelin,
“Chinese hold on Xinjiang: Strengths and Limits”, in François Godement ed., La Chine et
son Occident. China and its Western Frontier, Les Cahiers de l’Asie, IFRI, Paris, 2002, pp. 62-66; 
Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan tongji nianjian, (Statistical Yearbook of the Production
and Construction Corps in Xinjiang), Peking, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999.
13. It is hard to calculate the real number of Han living in Xinjiang because the Chinese
authorities, in their statistics, only declare communities under the jurisdiction of regional
authorities and not those under the jurisdiction of the central authorities.
14. By Islamism, we shall understand any movement led by intellectuals benefiting from a
modern education whose aim is “to build, starting with the power of the state, a global
political system which would manage all aspects of the society and the economy,
founding its authority only on Islam and rejecting any political pluralism”, (Olivier Roy, 
Généalogie de l’islamisme, Hachette, Paris, 2002, p. 10).
15. Bearing in mind the structural deficit of the autonomous region’s finances (about 50%
of the regional budget at the end of the 1990s), Xinjiang is mainly dependant on funding
from central government (see Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the nineties”, China Journal,
No. 44, July 2000, pp. 71-74).
16. In January 2000, Peking launched the campaign it called “Opening up the Great West”
(Xibu dakaifa) in order to reduce the development gap between the East and the West of
China. It aims in particular to encourage investment in the whole area made up of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Autonomous Regions of Tibet, of Ningxia, of
Guangxi, of Inner Mongolia, the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan,
Guizhou and the municipality of Chongqing. Although the effectiveness of the proposed
measures is doubtful, the Xinjiang authorities refer frequently to them to assure the
autochthonous populations that they have not been abandoned and that all measures are
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being taken to improve their living conditions. On the campaign and what is at stake, see
David S. G. Goodman, “The politics of the West: equality, nation-building and
colonisation”, in La Chine et son Occident. China and its Western Frontier, IFRI, Les Cahiers
d’Asie, Paris, 2001, pp. 23-55.
17. 2002 Zhongguo tongji nianjian (Statistical Yearbook of China), Peking, Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 2002, p. 51.
18. The main pioneer areas were opened up along the Hami-Turfan-Urumqi-Changji-
Shihezi line, and along a line pushing out westwards (Yanji-Korla-Luntai-Aksu...).
Extending the transport infrastructures mainly favoured colonisation by making zones
that were formerly remote more accessible to the colonists. In the 1950s, only Kumul
(Hami) was linked to the rest of the Chinese railway network. Urumqi was linked up in
1960. The Turfan-Korla section was completed in 1984, connecting Urumqi to the Kazakh
frontier was achieved in the early 1990s and the Korla-Aksu-Kashgar section in 1999. The
cross-desert road linking Khotan to Korla was finished in 1995. Thus, since the north of
the Tarim Basin was given its rail link to the Chinese network and since Khotan was
linked by road to the north of the Tarim Basin, the historical centres of Uyghur
population, once isolated, have been receiving a steady influx of colonists.
19. The threshold set by the international organisations is about a dollar per day (that is,
about 3,000 yuan per year).
20. In Xinjiang, bearing in mind the omnipresence of putonghua in the administration and
the economy, it is essential to master it in order to rise to posts of responsibility. Young
Uyghur pupils have a choice between attending “Uyghur classes” where teaching is
conducted mainly in Uyghur and “Chinese classes” where teaching is conducted in
Mandarin (Chinese). The Uyghur elite (often mastering Mandarin by themselves)
frequently send their children to the Chinese classes to ensure for them better chances of
professional success. However, bearing in mind the risks of losing one’s own culture that
this choice incurs for some people, bearing in mind the fairly strict compartmentalisation
of Han and Uyghur housing, and also because in the remote rural Uyghur areas these
Chinese classes are not available, most Uyghur families send their children to the
“Uyghur classes” near where they live. Thus, many young people, despite the existence of
Chinese lessons and classes taught in Chinese in the “Uyghur classes”, do not master
Chinese by the time they leave.
21. The continuous influx of the Han produces on the labour market significant tensions
that are aggravated by the fact that the economy is dominated by the Han. Since Han
people prefer to be surrounded by Han people, the jobs that they create go to them and
not to the Uyghurs. This “preferential job recruitment” is mainly observable in the
private sector where there is no encouragement for employers to recruit from the
national minorities. Many Uyghurs speak resentfully of this kind of discrimination in the
labour market and complain that, with equal or superior skills, they cannot compete with
the Han or the Hui (Interviews, Xinjiang, 1999-2002).
22. Emily Hannum and Yu Xie, “Ethnic stratification in Northwest China: occupational
differences between Han Chinese and national minorities in Xinjiang, 1982-1990”, 
Demography, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1998, p. 328.
23. See Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National
Development, 1536-1966, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. Whether Xinjiang fulfils
the half-dozen criteria that qualify a territory as an interior colony is the subject of much
debate. However, in our opinion, whether the peripheral community considers itself to be
colonised is more important than validating these criteria, when it comes to
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understanding how these situations of stratification (perceived or real) can lead to ethnic
nationalism.
24. Interviews, 1999-2002. See for example, East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC),
“Sherqiy Turkistanda Bashbalasi Hitay Koçmenliri” (The Chinese Migrants in East
Turkistan), www.uygur.org.
25. Interviews, Xinjiang, 1999-2002.
26. Ibid.
27. Cf note 22.
28. Colin Mackerras, “Xinjiang and the causes of separatism”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 20,
No. 3, 2001, p. 290.
29. See Elizabeth Allès, Leïla Chérif-Chebbi & Constance-Hélène Halfon, “L’islam chinois,
unité et fragmentation”, Archives de sciences sociales des religions, n° 115, 2001, pp. 15-47.
30. On religious education in China, see Elisabeth Allès, “Muslim Religious Education in
China”, China Perspectives, No. 45, January-February 2003, pp. 21-29. 
31. As Pierre Bourdieu has underlined in his analysis of the relationship between the 
habitus and class conflicts, the habitus is governed by relational influences. Above all, it is
public, in that it is meant to carry meaning in other people’s eyes. In this regard, the
study of the evolution of the Uyghur habitus gives us extensive information on the nature
of the relations between the Uyghurs and the Chinese centre.
32. Artoush Kumul, “Le séparatisme ouïghour au XXe siècle”, CEMOTI, n° 25, January-June
1998, p. 88.
33. Zhang Yumo, “The Anti-Separatism Struggle and its Historical Lessons since the
Liberation of Xinjiang” in Yang Faren et al., Fanyisilanzhuyi, fantujuezhuyi yanjiu (Study on
Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism), 1994, a document translated and published in English on
the web site of the Uyghur American Association, www.uyghuramerican.org/
researchanalysis/trans.html.
34. The meshrep are gatherings at the local level, favouring the communication of
traditional Uyghur culture. This movement for revitalising traditional culture was
intended also to stem the loss of “moral values” among young Uyghurs (the weakening of
intergenerational solidarity, criminal behaviour, consumption of drugs and alcohol . . .).
35. Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights
in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region”, April 1st 1999, pp. 18-19.
36. On the rise of militant nationalism among young Uyghurs, see also the study by
Joanne Smith, “Four Generations of Uyghurs: the Shift towards Ethno-political Ideologies
among Xinjiang’s Youth”, Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000, pp. 195-224.
37. Although this study sets out in particular to look at the political manifestations of the
“Uyghur malaise” it is important to note that this malaise also feeds a “sub-political
resistance” anchored mainly in the daily life of the Uyghurs. On this question, see
Gardner Bovington, “The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in
Xinjiang”, Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 39-78.
38. This study is limited to active movements in Xinjiang. On political groupings in the
Diaspora, see Frédérique-Jeanne Besson, “Les Ouïghours de la diaspora”, Cahiers d’études
sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI), n° 25, July-December 1998,
pp. 161-192.
39. Cf note 6. On this point, over and above the debate about emancipation and the means
to achieve it, the accent is placed either on the struggle for the recognition of the
sovereign rights of the Uyghur nation, or else on the need to defend the interests of the
various Turkic-speaking populations within the context of a Pan-Turkic project on the
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scale of Xinjiang: both views are aired in the debate among the different nationalist
movements over how the region should be named: Uyghuristan in the former view, East
Turkistan for the latter. See, on the question, ETIC, “Sherqiy Turkistanmu?
Uyghuristanmu?” (East Turkistan? Uyghuristan?).
40. Interviews, Uyghur Diaspora 2002. According to Artoush Kumul, it was already active
in the late 1950s (see Artoush Kumul, op. cit., p. 85).
41. Taipei Times, October 11th 1999.
42. Zhang Yumo, op. cit.
43. Ibid.
44. Cf note 8.
45. Ibid.
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